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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
INTERMOUNTAIN REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, as assignee of 
TMC CONTRACTORS, INC., 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DRA W, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
And 
KEVIN TAGGART, an Individual, CAMDEN 
COURT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
TIMBERLINE PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, AARON DEAN 
EDDINGTON, an Individual, CITIZENS 
COMMUNITY BANK and ALL OTHER 
PERSONS UNKNOWN CLAIMING INTEREST 
IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, 
Defendants. 
SUPREME COURT # 40335 
Bingham County Case No. 
CV-2009-1641 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
State of Idaho In and For the County of Bingham 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, Presiding 
Attorney for Appellant 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
Manwaring Law Office, P.A. 
381 Shoup Ave., Ste. 210 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Attorney for Respondent 
J. Michael Whieler 
THOMSEN STEVENS 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from the district court's summary judgment in favor of a property 
owner determining its real property was not subject to the claim of a materialmen's lien. 
At the request of a developer, TMC Contractors, Inc., performed work to grade and 
pave a private drive and parking spaces in Taylorview Development. Draw, LLC, owned real 
property within that development, including an easement interest in the private drive. 
After completing its work, TMC was not fully paid. It recorded a materialmen's lien 
against all real property within the development. TMC later assigned its lien to Intermountain 
Real Properties, LLC. 
Initially, the district court determined the developer was not an agent for Draw for 
purposes of establishing a nexus between TMC's work and Draw and determined Draw's 
property was not within Taylorview Development. Upon Intermountain's motion for 
reconsideration, the district court again determined Draw's property was not within 
Taylorview Development; thus, the materialmen's lien was not enforceable against Draw's 
property. Additionally, the district court ordered Intermountain to pay some of Draw's 
attorney fees finding the claims arose from a commercial transaction. 
This appeal followed the district court's denial of Intermountain's motion for 
reconsideration. 
Course of the Proceedings 
TMC filed a Complaint to foreclose its materialmen's lien on July 23, 2009. (Clerk's 
Record, pp.16-29). 
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Draw filed an Answer on September 3,2009. (Clerk's Record, pp. 59-61). 
After receiving TMC's assignment of its claim and action, Intermountain filed a 
verified Amended Complaint. (Clerk's Record, pp. 38-54). 
On March 5, 2010 Intermountain filed its motion and memorandum for summary 
judgment against Draw and others. (Clerk's Record, p. 5 - ROA Report). 
Draw filed no response to Intermountain's motion. (Clerk's Record, pp. 5-6, 82-83). 
Intermountain obtained summary judgment against Draw on April 19,2010. (Clerk's 
Record, pp. 82-83). 
After a sheriff's sale upon writ of execution in November 2010, Draw filed a motion 
for relief from judgment on December 17,2010. (Clerk's Record, p. 7 - ROA Report). 
Intermountain filed its objection to Draw's motion on January 17, 2011. (Clerk's 
Record, 8 - ROA Report). 
The district court heard Draw's motion for relief on January 31, 2011. (Clerk's 
Record, p. 8 - ROA Report). 
By order filed April 12, 2011 the district court granted Draw's motion for relief. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 8 - ROA Report). 
Draw filed its Amended Answer and Counterclaim on September 6, 2011. (Clerk's 
Record, pp. 92-101). 
Intermountain filed its Reply to Draw's Counterclaim on October 13, 2011. (Clerk's 
Record, pp. 102-103). 
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On March 6, 2012, Draw filed its motion for summary judgment. (Clerk's Record, p. 
8 - ROA Report). 
Intermountain on April 6, 2012 filed its response in opposition to Draw's motion 
supported by affidavits of Shawn Allen and Sandy Gaydusek. (Clerk's Record, pp. 105-113). 
Hearing before the district court on Draw's motion for summary judgment was held 
April 30, 2012. (Transcript of Hearing, Motionfor Summary Judgment, pp. 5-56). 
The district court on May 25, 2012 entered its Order Granting Draw's motion for 
summary judgment. (Clerk's Record, pp.175-195). 
Judgment for Draw was entered June 7, 2012 and certified as a final judgment. 
(Clerk's Record, pp.200-202). 
On June 19, 2012 Intermountain filed a motion for reconsideration together with an 
affidavit of Robert Butler in support of the motion. (Clerk's Record, pp. 220-221; 223-226). 
On June 13,2012 Draw filed a motion and memorandum for costs and fees. (Clerk's 
Record, p. 14 - ROA Report). 
Intermountain filed on June 19, 2012 its objection to Draw's motion for costs and 
fees. (Clerk's Record, pp. 232-235). 
Hearing on Intermountain' motion for reconsideration was held July 9, 2012. 
(Transcript of Hearing, Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 5-49). 
On August 23, 2012 the district court filed its Order denying Intermountain' motion 
for reconsideration and awarding Draw partial fees. (Clerk's Record, pp. 236-260). 
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Judgment on attorney fees for Draw was entered August 30, 2012. (Clerk's Record, 
pp. 284-285). 
Intermountain timely filed notice of appeal on September 17, 2012. (Clerk's Record, 
pp.287-289). 
Statement of the Facts 
The following salient facts are derived from the affidavits and pleadings of record. 
Intermountain Real Properties, LLC, is an Idaho limited liability company and the 
assignee ofTMC Contractors, Inc.'s, materialmen's lien. (Clerk's Record, pp. 37-53). 
Shawn Allen was the owner and developer of Taylorview Development in Bingham 
County, Idaho. (Clerk's Record, pp. 138-142). 
Kevin Taggatijoined Allen in developing Taylorview Development. (Clerk's Record, 
pp. 138-142) 
Allen sold to Taggart through Taggart's entity, Timberline, several parcels within 
Taylorview Development. (Clerk's Record, pp. 138-142). In turn, Taggart through 
Timberline sold a parcel to Draw. (Clerk's Record, pp. 138-142; 223-226). 
Draw's real property consists of a parcel of undeveloped land together with an 
easement interest in a private drive accessing Draw's property from a public street. (Clerk's 
Record, pp. 138-142; 223-226). Draw's parcel and the concomitant private drive are situated 
wholly within Taylorview Development. (Clerk's Record, pp. 223-226). 
During their development of Taylorview Development, Allen and Taggart hired TMC 
to perform the work necessary to grade and pave the private drive and parking spaces within 
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the development. (Clerk's Record, pp. 138-142). TMC performed the requested paving work. 
(Clerk's Record, pp. 138-142; 144-156). 
In addition to having the private drive paved, Allen improved a spur road on land 
owned by the City of Shelley. (Clerk's Record, pp. 138-142; 144-156). 
When its bill was not fully paid, TMC recorded a materialmen's lien against all real 
property in Taylorview Development, including Draw's parcel. (Clerk's Record, pp.l6-29). 
TMC assigned all of its rights under the materialmen's lien and its foreclosure action 
to Intermountain. (Clerk's Record, p. 45). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the district court err in disregarding the positive testimony found in the affidavit 
of Robert Butler proving Draw's real property was within Taylorview Development? 
Did the district court err as a matter of law in awarding Draw some of its attorney 
fees based upon I.C. § 12-120(3) finding there was a commercial transaction between TMC 
and Draw? 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court erred in disregarding positive testimony found in the affidavit of 
Robert Butler proving Draw's real property was within Taylorview Development. 
Standard of Review 
When reviewing a district court's summary judgment, the standard of review on 
appeal is the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion. 
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56(c). 
Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving 
party. The appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. 
Castorena v. General Electric, 149 Idaho 609, 613, 238 P.3d 209,213 (2010). 
Argument 
The purpose of Idaho's mechanics' and materialmen's lien statutes is to compensate 
persons who perform labor and provide materials for improvements to or upon real property. 
See generally BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893-94, 174 P.3d 399, 402-03 
(2007). Idaho's appellate courts have historically construed materialmen's lien laws 
"liberally in favor of the person who performs labor upon or furnishes materials" used in 
making improvements to real property. Id. Specific language in Idaho's Constitution 
guarantees such interest where it states, "[t]he legislature shall provide by proper legislation 
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for giving to mechanics, laborers, and material men an adequate lien on the subject matter of 
their labor." IDAHO CONST. art. XIII, § 6. 
Idaho Code § 45-501 creates two distinct types of liens- a lien against some form of 
structure, alternately referred to in later sections of the lien law as an "improvement," and a 
lien created in favor of one who improves the land, itself, by grading, leveling, and the like. 
Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, 151 Idaho 740, 264 P.3d 379 
(2011). 
That same statute provides, "any person having charge .. .in whole or in part, of any 
building or other improvement, as aforesaid, shall be held to be the agent of the owner for the 
purpose of this chapter. ... " Under I.C. § 45-504, any person who, at the request of the owner 
of any lot in any incorporated city or town, surveys, grades, fills in, or otherwise improves 
the same or the street in front of or adjoining the same, has a lien upon such lot for his work 
done or material furnished. 
The district court committed two errors in reaching its decision granting summary 
judgment to Draw: 1) it failed to apply the clear language of § 45-501; and 2) on 
Intermountain's motion for reconsideration, it disregarded positive testimony of Robert 
Butler establishing Draw's parcel as being part of Taylorview Development. 
As developers of Taylorview Development, Allen and Taggart were persons "having 
charge ... in whole or in part, of any building or other improvement" and "shall be held to be 
the agent of the owner for the purpose of this chapter. ... " I.C. § 45-501. The district court did 
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not consider that aspect of the materialmen's lien statute in making its decision because it 
instead held Draw's parcel was not within Taylorview Development. 
The affidavit of Allen was not contradicted by Draw in any manner. Allen's 
testimony established that the private drive was paved at his or Taggart's direction as the 
developer and owner of the property. Although there was no clear agency nexus established 
between Draw and Allen or Taggart for purposes of establishing contractual liability, the 
applicable statute deems Allen and Taggart shall be the agents of Draw for purposes of the 
private drive. 
In its decision granting Draw's motion for summary judgment, the district court 
reached a finding that the evidence before it did not clearly show Draw's parcel was part of 
Taylorview Development. Accordingly, Intermountain filed a motion for reconsideration, 
which motion was supported by the affidavit of Robert Butler. Butler was the surveying 
engineer who prepared the Record of Survey for Taylorview Development. In addition, he 
prepared the legal descriptions for the respective parcels within the Development. Those 
legal descriptions were used in conveying title to Draw and other purchasers. 
Butler affirmatively testified that, "All of the property described in the deed to Draw 
lies within the Record of Survey for Taylorview Development." (Clerk's Record, p. 223-
226). 
Despite Butler's testimony, the district court on reconsideration focused erroneously 
on a "black line which appears to define the boundaries of the Taylorview Development." 
(Clerk's Record, p. 142). Further compounding that error, the district court examined a tax 
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parcel map from the Bingham County Assessor's Office and made the following factual 
determination. "That document also shows a black line around celiain parcels of real estate, 
but excludes Draw's Property from the group." (Clerk's Record, p. 142). The Assessor's tax 
plat contained no information on its face concerning the line depictions given on the plat. Nor 
was there any affidavit upon which the district court could rely for explaining the "black 
lines" on that plat. (Clerk's Record, p. 142). 
Implied, if not expressed, within the district court's decision is a factual finding that 
the "black lines" seen on the record of survey and Assessor's plat are the actual boundary 
lines for Taylorview Development. That finding is not supported by any factual evidence. To 
the contrary, the evidence before the court shows Draw's parcel lies within the development. 
Nevertheless, the district court relied upon the "black lines" to reach its determination 
that Draw's parcel was not located in Taylorview Development. Seemingly avoiding its 
judicial obligation to liberally construe § 45-501 in favor of Intermountain, the district court 
opted instead to find Draw's parcel was not part of Taylorview Development. Consequently, 
the district court denied Intermountain's motion for reconsideration. 
Idaho has long followed the legal principal that positive testimony cannot be 
disregarded by a trial court or jury in favor of unsupported testimony or evidence. Pierstorif 
v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 447-48, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937); Dinneen v. Finch, 603 
P.2d 575, 582, 100 Idaho 620, 625 (1979). 
"The rule was recently announced by this court that the court must accept as true the 
positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently 
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improbable, or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or the trial 
and that the trial court may not arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the testimony of a witness 
unimpeached by any of the modes known to the law, if such testimony does not exceed 
probability." First Trust & Savings Bank v. Randall, 59 Idaho 705, 715, 89 P.2d 741 (1939). 
A court "must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, 
unless his testimony is inherently improbable or rendered so by facts and circumstances 
disclosed at the hearing." Dinneen v. Finch, 603 P.2d 575, 582,100 Idaho 620, 625 (1979). 
In that connection, the Idaho Supreme Court has instructively held that when 
considering motions for summary judgment the trial court should apply the following 
standard: 
In this process the Court must look to the "totality of the motions, affidavits, 
depositions, pleadings, and attached exhibits," not merely to portions of the 
record in isolation. Central Idaho Agency, supra, 92 Idaho at 310, 442 P.2d at 
446. Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact. 
"[A]ll doubts are to be resolved against the moving party." The motion must 
be denied "if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn 
therefrom and if reasonable [people] might reach different conclusions." 
Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 69, 593 P.2d 402, 404 (1979), citing Petricevich v. Salmon 
River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868-69,452 P.2d 362,365-66 (1969). 
Accordingly, the district court erred in disregarding the testimony of Robert Butler. 
The district court's error was compounded by its isolated reliance on black lines on the 
record of survey and a plat from an assessor's office that were unexplained and did not 
contain any positive testimony upon which the court could reasonably rely. 
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Butler's affidavit contains testimony that is reliable and not inherently improbable. 
Butler's testimony cannot be ignored. On the strength of Butler's testimony, Intermountain 
proved Draw's parcel was located entirely within Taylorview Development. The evidence 
before the district court at least was such that conflicting inferences could be drawn 
therefrom, thus constituting a question of fact upon which reasonable minds could differ, 
thus, preventing summary judgment. 
In addition, the district court overlooked Draw's interest in the easement to the 
private road in the development. Not only was Draw's parcel located within Taylorview 
Development, but also Draw by deed was granted an easement interest in the private road. 
That private road was Draw's access to the public street. 
Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Draw. 
Based on the record on appeal, the district court did not attempt to apply 45-501 to 
Intermountain's claim that Allen and or Taggart were persons in charge of the development 
and "shall be held" agents of Draw. Consequently, the appellate court does not have 
sufficient record to answer that question itself. See Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 
P.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990). Remand is required to allow the district court to consider 
application of 45-50 1 to the facts presented on summary judgment. 
"Where an appellate court reverses or vacates a judgment upon an issue properly 
raised, and remands for further proceedings, it may give guidance for. .. issues on remand." 
Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 159,45 P.3d 810, 815 (2002); Bratton v. Scott, 150 Idaho 530, 
248 P.3d 1265 (2011). 
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Intermountain has previously cited the law in Idaho requiring liberal construction of 
the materialmen's lien statutes in favor of compensation of those who provide labor and 
materials in the improvement of real property. Intermountain invites the Court on appeal to 
give direction to the district court on the interpretation of 45-501 where it states "any person 
having charge .. .in whole or in part, of any building or other improvement, as aforesaid, shall 
be held to be the agent of the owner for the purpose of this chapter .... " 
Application of the statute begins with the language at issue: "and every 
contractor, subcontractor, architect, builder or any person having charge of ... 
the construction, alteration or repair, either in whole or in part, of any building 
or other improvement, as aforesaid, shall be held to be the agent of the owner 
for the purpose of this chapter." I.e. § 45-501. 
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, statutory 
construction is unnecessary, and this Court need only determine the 
application of the words to the facts of the case. A statute is ambiguous where 
the language is reasonably capable of more than one conflicting construction. 
However, "[a]mbiguity is not established merely because differing 
interpretations are presented to a court; otherwise, all statutes subject to 
litigation would be considered ambiguous." Therefore, "[t]he interpretation 
should begin with an examination of the literal words of the statute, and this 
language should be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning." 
L & W Supply Corp. v. Chartrand Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738, 743, 40 P.3d 96, 101 
(2002)( citations omitted). 
Construction of a statute is a question of law over which the appellate courts in Idaho 
have free review. Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 
(2005). 
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In L& W the court examined the plain language of the statute in question and found 
that a supplier was too remote in connection with improvements to constitute a person in 
charge for purposes of the materialmen's statute. 
In this action, TMC was dealing directly with Allen and Taggart, the two and only 
two persons in charge of Taylorview Development. Under the facts set forth in Allen's 
affidavit, TMC reasonably relied on Allen and Taggart's positions as developers in agreeing 
to grade and pave the private drive. Intermountain believes the Court on appeal can give 
guidance on remand to the district court that if it finds Allen and Taggart were persons in 
charge of Taylorview Development, it should construe 45-501 in favor ofIntermountain. 
The summary judgment in favor of Draw should be vacated. This action should be 
remanded to the district court to consider the positive testimony of Butler and then determine 
whether there are genuine issues of material fact preventing summary judgment or reverse its 
decision and grant summary judgment to Intermountain. 
B. The District Court erred as a matter of law in awarding Draw some of its attorney fees 
under I.e. § 12-120(3) finding there was a commercial transaction between TMC and Draw. 
Standard of Review 
"Whether a district court has correctly determined that a case is based on a 
'commercial transaction' for the purpose ofLC. § 12-120(3) is a question oflaw" over which 
the appellate court exercises free review. Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Canst., Inc., 144 Idaho 
171, 173, 158 P.3d 947,949 (2007). 
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Argument 
"Under I.C. § 12-120(3), a prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees if a 
'commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the 
party is attempting to recover.'" Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 744, 274 
P.3d 1256, 1269 (2012), quoting Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 
152 P .3d 594, 599 (2007). "We today make clear that, in order for a transaction to be 
commercial, each party to the transaction must enter the transaction for a commercial 
purpose." Id. (Emphasis added). 
"It is oft repeated by this Court that, 'If the party is claiming that a statute provides 
authority for an award of attorney fees, the party must cite to the statute and, if applicable, 
the specific subsection of the statute upon which the party relies.'" Stephen v. Sallaz & 
Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521, 530,248 P.3d 1256, 1265 (2011). 
Draw argued that because Intermountain had alleged in its complaint a contract 
existed between TMC and Draw, then Draw could claim for fees based on a contract under 
I.e. § 12-120(3) even if the district court did not find a contract existed. Further, Draw urged 
the finding that there was a commercial transaction between TMC and Draw. Neither 
argument was sound. However, the district court found a commercial transaction was the 
gravamen of Intermountain's complaint and, thus, awarded fees. (Clerk's Record, pp. 236-
260). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that if there was no commercial transaction 
between the parties, then 12-120(3) does not apply. "Attorney fees for LU under section 
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120(3) are inappropriate in this case because there was no commercial transaction between 
Hopkins and LU." Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, 151 Idaho 
740, 748, 264 P.3d 379,387 (2011). 
Relying on its holding in BECO Canst. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 
726, 184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008), the Court in Hopkins observed that where there is no 
"transaction" between the parties, 12-120(3) does not apply. Id. "Therefore, attorney fees 
under section 120(3) would be inappropriate." Id. 
There was no transaction between TMC and Draw. As determined by the district 
court, the transaction was between TMC, Allen and Taggart. Draw prevailed at summary 
judgment in showing there was no contract, agreement, or transaction between it and Taggart 
or Allen. 
Draw may assert a claim for fees under 12-120(3) due to Intermountain's pleading 
requesting fees under the same statute. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a 
pleading for fees is not a judicial admission of fact; rather, the question of whether a case 
arises from a commercial transaction is purely a question of law for the Court to determine. 
Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 744, 274 P.3d 1256, 1269 (2012)(footnote 8). 
The district court erred in determining there was a commercial transaction between 
Intermountain and Draw. An award of attorney fees under 12-120(3) to Draw was 
inappropriate. 
As a matter of law, the district court's judgment awarding fees to Draw must be 
vacated. 
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C. Intermountain is entitled to an award of costs on appeal. 
In accordance with LA.R. 41 and 35(b)(5), Intermountain requests on appeal an 
award of its costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Judgment should 
be vacated together with the subsequent certified Final Judgment and amended judgment 
awarding fees. 
The case should be remanded to the district court with directions to consider 
application ofLC. § 45-501 to Intermountain's complaint to foreclose its materialmen's lien 
against Draw's parcel. 
Dated this -L.6 day of December 2012. 
~Y124~v Kipp L. Manwaring 
Attorney for Appellant 
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